



IFPRI Discussion Paper 00723 
October 2007 
 
Rural Investments to Accelerate Growth and  
Poverty Reduction in Kenya  
James Thurlow, International Food Policy Research Institute 
Jane Kiringai, Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis 
and 
Madhur Gautam, World Bank  
 
Development Strategy and Governance Division  
INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) was established in 1975. IFPRI is one of 15 
agricultural research centers that receive principal funding from governments, private foundations, and 
international and regional organizations, most of which are members of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research. 
FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTORS AND PARTNERS 
IFPRI’s research, capacity strengthening, and communications work is made possible by its financial 
contributors and partners. IFPRI gratefully acknowledges generous unrestricted funding from Australia, 
Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 






IFPRI Discussion Paper 00723 
October 2007 
 
Rural Investments to Accelerate Growth and  
Poverty Reduction in Kenya  
James Thurlow, International Food Policy Research Institute 
Jane Kiringai, Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis 
and 
Madhur Gautam, World Bank  
 
Development Strategy and Governance Division  
PUBLISHED BY 
INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY  
RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
2033 K Street, NW 








1 Effective January 2007, the Discussion Paper series within each division and the Director General’s Office of IFPRI 
were merged into one IFPRI-wide Discussion Paper series. The new series begins with number 00689, reflecting the 
prior publication of 688 discussion papers within the dispersed series. The earlier series are available on IFPRI’s 
website at www.ifpri.org/pubs/otherpubs.htm#dp. 
2 IFPRI Discussion Papers contain preliminary material and research results. They have not been subject to formal 
external reviews managed by IFPRI’s Publications Review Committee but have been reviewed by at least one 




Copyright 2007 International Food Policy Research Institute. All rights reserved. Sections of this material may be 
reproduced for personal and not-for-profit use without the express written permission of but with acknowledgment to 
IFPRI. To reproduce the material contained herein for profit or commercial use requires express written permission. 




1.  Introduction................................................................................................................................ 1 
2.  Growth, Poverty and Agriculture in Kenya............................................................................... 3 
3.  Searching for Sources of Poverty-Reducing Growth............................................................... 11 
4.  Investing in Agricultural Growth............................................................................................. 22 
5.  Conclusions.............................................................................................................................. 33 
Appendix: Supplementary Tables................................................................................................. 35 
References..................................................................................................................................... 38 
   iv
List of Tables 
1.  Past and projected growth performance, 1992–2007................................................................. 3 
2.  Changes in the incidence of poverty, 1992–2000...................................................................... 4 
3.  Regional characteristics............................................................................................................. 9 
4.  Growth outcomes under growth scenarios............................................................................... 14 
5.  Poverty outcomes under growth scenarios .............................................................................. 15 
6.  Sectoral growth multipliers...................................................................................................... 18 
7.  Elasticities in the productivity-investment function................................................................ 25 
8.  Growth outcomes under investment scenarios ........................................................................ 27 
9.  Poverty outcomes under investment scenarios........................................................................ 28 
10.  Poverty–growth elasticities and benefit–cost ratios under investment scenarios.................. 31 
A1.  Structure of the kenyan economy, 2003................................................................................ 35 
A2.  Sectors and commodities in the CGE-microsimulation model............................................. 36 
A3.  Assumptions in calibrating the baseline scenario................................................................. 36 
A4.  Detailed growth rates under investment scenarios................................................................ 37 
List of Figures  
1.  Kenya’s agrological zones and metropolitan centers................................................................. 8 
2.  Growth incidence curves under growth scenarios................................................................... 19 
3.  Changes in poverty under growth scenarios, 2003–15............................................................ 21 
4.  Public spending on agriculture and roads, 1991–2009............................................................ 23 
5.  Final agricultural expenditure shares under investment scenarios, 2015 ................................ 26 
6.  Poverty headcounts under investment scenarios, 2015............................................................ 30 
7.  Average annual GDP growth under investment scenarios, 2006–15 ...................................... 32   v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
A number of people contributed to this report. In particular we thank Bernadette Wanjala, who helped 
build the social accounting matrix; James Njeru and Nicholas Waiyaki, who provided information on 
Kenya’s agricultural systems; and Sam Benin and Xinshen Diao for their technical advice. The Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations provided funding. The views expressed in this report are 
the authors’ and not necessarily those of any participating organizations.   vi
ABSTRACT 
Kenya’s economy is relatively diverse, with both agricultural and industrial potential. However, the 
economy has performed poorly over the last decade, and poverty and inequality have risen. This paper 
examines the impact of alternative growth paths and rural investments on poverty using an economy-wide 
model. It finds that if Kenya continues along its current growth path, its economy will have to grow by  
more than 10 percent per year over the coming decade to meet the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 
of halving poverty by 2015. Therefore, Kenya must search for alternative sources of poverty-reducing 
growth. The results of the model indicate that poverty is unlikely to decline significantly without an 
acceleration of agricultural growth.  Growth in agriculture is found to benefit both urban and rural 
households, whereas industry-led growth benefits a smaller segment of the urban population, thus 
exacerbating inequality. Kenya’s current Economic Recovery Strategy, however, is not optimistic about 
agriculture’s growth potential, focusing more heavily on industry-led growth. Therefore, as Kenya 
prepares its new national strategy, the country should place greater emphasis on and direct resources 
toward accelerating agricultural growth.  
In assessing the impact of rural investments on growth and poverty, the paper finds that 
increasing agricultural spending to meet the 10 percent target set by the Maputo Declaration would lift an 
additional 1.5 million people above the poverty line by 2015. Specific agricultural investments have 
higher returns in different parts of the country, however. Irrigation favors the lowlands and the poorest 
segment of the population, while research and extension (R&E) favors the midlands and highlands. 
Investment in R&E is also found to have the highest returns in both growth and poverty reduction. 
However, increasing agricultural spending to 10 percent of total spending is insufficient to meet either the 
MDG or the 6 percent agricultural growth target of the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development 
Program, which Kenya has recently adopted. . Achieving this target requires nonagricultural investments, 
such as in roads and market development. Building rural roads and reducing agricultural transaction costs 
significantly reduces poverty and encourages growth beyond rural areas. While it is necessary to increase 
spending on agriculture, the fiscal burden of an agricultural strategy can be greatly reduced by improving 
investment efficiency.  
Keywords:  agriculture, rural investment, poverty, inequality, Kenya, Africa     1
1.  INTRODUCTION  
Kenya’s economy is diverse, with both agricultural and industrial potential. However, the economy has 
not performed well over the last decade, and evidence indicates that poverty and inequality have 
worsened. Therefore, it is imperative that Kenya’s government fosters stronger growth and a process of 
income generation that benefits the broader population. As discussed in the next chapter, numerous 
studies emphasize the importance of rural development in Kenya, largely because a majority of the 
population, especially poor households, lives in rural areas, where they rely heavily on agricultural 
incomes. Urban households also depend on rural areas as a source of food and as a market for 
nonagricultural goods. However, Kenya’s current strategy does not take an optimistic view of 
agriculture’s potential contribution to economic growth. This strategy emphasizes creation of a dynamic 
industrial sector that can provide employment opportunities and improve incomes. These objectives are 
important if Kenya is to diversify its economy and encourage long-term structural transformation. 
However, the current strategy is drawing to a close and has not yet established rapid economic growth. 
This again raises questions about potential sources of growth and appropriate allocations of public 
investments.  
It appears that agriculture might play a more important role in the country’s future strategy. The 
government has recently adopted the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) 
promulgated under the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). This program sets a 
continent-wide agricultural growth target of 6 percent. To achieve this growth, Kenya’s government has 
signed the Maputo Declaration, which calls on African governments to increase the share of agricultural 
spending to 10 percent of their total budgets.  
In light of these developments, this paper assesses alternative growth paths for Kenya in terms of 
their ability to reduce poverty. It also assesses the impact and fiscal implications of investing in 
agriculture and rural infrastructure in order to accelerate agricultural growth. Chapter 2 reviews Kenya’s 
recent economic performance, its existing development strategy, and the role of agriculture in the 
economy. Chapter 3 estimates the impact of Kenya’s current growth path on poverty, using a dynamic 
economy-wide model. The study finds that there are unlikely to be significant reductions in poverty under 
the current growth path. Furthermore, Kenya would have to grow extremely fast over the coming decade 
if it is to meet the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving poverty by 2015. Accordingly, 
Kenya must search for alternative sources of poverty-reducing growth. Here we compare alternative 
growth options and find strong support for focusing greater attention on agriculture. Achieving the 6 
percent agricultural growth target will significantly reduce poverty. Chapter 4 describes a possible 
investment strategy borne out of the 10 percent expenditure target set by the Maputo Declaration, by   2
extending the economy-wide model to include a public investment function and, drawing on the literature, 
simulating increasing public spending on irrigation, research and extension, and rural roads. The results 
suggest that the 10 percent expenditure target is insufficient to achieve 6 percent agricultural growth 
unless the efficiency of public spending is improved. Meeting the agricultural growth target will require 
additional spending in rural infrastructure and market development. The paper concludes by summarizing 
the findings and providing recommendations for a more equitable growth strategy in Kenya.   3
2.  GROWTH, POVERTY AND AGRICULTURE IN KENYA 
Recent Performance and Policies 
Kenya has grown at an average rate of about 3 percent per year since reforms started in earnest during the 
early 1990s (see Table 1). This apparent continuity hides the volatility of growth over this period, as well 
as its shifting structure. For instance, agricultural growth was initially slow during the mid-1990s but rose 
rapidly to almost 5 percent before declining again after 2000. By contrast, the industrial sectors have 
followed the opposite trend, falling into stagnation during the late 1990s, then rising to average about 2 
percent growth overall. Some of the volatility in growth has undoubtedly been the result of reforms. 
Macrostabilization policies were aimed at lowering inflation and interest rates and ensuring a more stable 
exchange rate. These reforms were only partially successful: inflation and interest rates fell but did not 
stabilize. Exchange rate policies have proven more successful, although in recent years there has been a 
real appreciation that has favored imported capital goods but also raised concern over the competitiveness 
of agricultural exports.  
Table 1. Past and projected growth performance, 1992–2007 
Observed annual real compound growth rate (%)   GDP  share 
in 1997  1992-97 1997-2000 2000-04  1997-2004 
ERS proj. 
2003-07 
GDP  market  prices  100.0 2.9  2.1 3.0 2.6 6.0 
   Households  75.1  3.1  1.5  2.6  2.1  4.7 
   Investment  15.0  7.8  7.2  3.0  4.8  12.7 
   Government  17.3  3.4  -0.4  1.5  0.7  3.0 
   Exports  22.4  8.7  1.7  9.9  6.3  7.7 
   Imports  29.8  12.2  1.7  6.8  4.6  6.0 
GDP factor cost  100.0  3.0  1.8  2.7  2.3  6.0 
   Agriculture  18.1  1.7  4.3  2.6  3.3  3.1 
   Manufacturing  22.4  2.6  -0.5  2.1  0.8  8.6 
   Other industry  9.1  2.3  0.9  2.0  1.5  11.3 
   Private services  39.7  4.8  2.2  3.2  3.2  3.0 
   Public services  10.7  1.6  1.4  2.6  1.9  3.0 
Population          . . .  2.6  2.4  1.9  2.1  2.0 
Source: GK  2003b; 2006 
Note: GDP is gross domestic product in constant 2001 prices; ERS is Economic Recovery Strategy projections.  
Investment remained high during the 1990s despite lingering macroeconomic instability. 
However, this has not translated into more rapid economic growth, with capital being increasingly 
underutilized in the manufacturing sector. This may be due to the sequencing of reforms since 
macrostabilization was implemented alongside privatization and liberalization. While trade liberalization 
has been ongoing since the mid-1980s, the effect of foreign competition has been a slowdown in 
industrial growth during the 1990s. Domestic liberalization was also pronounced. Prior to reforms the   4
government was heavily engaged in agricultural markets, primarily through marketing boards that 
managed most areas of the sector from input provision to marketing and exporting. During the reform 
period the government abolished many of these boards and removed price controls in order to shift the 
function of the state away from active participation toward market regulation. While it is difficult to 
determine the effects of reforms, both agriculture and industry were affected and have performed better 
during the postreform period. 
Economic growth was offset by high population growth, so that average per capita incomes 
stagnated during the 1990s. However, average income measures ignore the distribution of incomes and 
therefore provide only a rough indication of changing household welfare. Direct poverty measurement is 
preferable but difficult in Kenya. Three household surveys that estimate the level and distribution of 
poverty have been conducted over the last 10 years. However, differences in the design and 
implementation of these surveys prevent an accurate comparison of poverty over time. For instance, the 
1992 Welfare Monitoring Survey (WMSI) covered half of the country, the 1994 WMS(II) covered all the 
districts, and the 1997 WMS(III) excluded the North Eastern province (Table 2).  
Table 2. Changes in the incidence of poverty, 1992–2000 
  Poverty incidence or headcount (P0) 
 1992  1994a  1994b  1997  1999/2000  2000 
 WMSI  WMSII  WMSII  WMSIII  Census  Projected 
National 46.3  43.8  45.5  51.3  54.1  56.8 
   Rural  47.9  46.8  45.9 52.9  55.0  59.6 
   Urban  29.3  28.9  -  49.2  51.0  51.5 
   Nairobi  26.5  25.9  -  50.2  43.9  52.6 
   Central  35.9  31.9  32.3 31.4  31.1  35.3 
   Coast  43.5  55.6  55.8 62.1  57.6  69.9 
   Eastern  42.2  57.8  56.7 58.6  58.3  65.9 
   Nyanza  47.4  42.2  42.3 50.1  64.6  70.9 
   Rift Valley  51.5  42.9 41.4  50.1  47.9  56.3 
   Western  54.8  53.8  54.0  58.8  60.8  66.1 












Survey period  Nov-Dec  June-Aug  Apr-June  -  - 





Climatic conditions  Poor  Favorable  El Nino  Average  Drought 
CPI inflation for period  30%  30%  15%  5%  8% 
Source: GK 2000; 2003a; Kimalu et al. 2002 
Note: The 1999/2000 poverty rates are based on small area econometric estimates derived by combining the recent population 
census with the 1997 WMSIII. The 2000 rates are derived by updating the 1997 level and distribution of expenditures, based on 
changes in per capita growth from national accounts and projected Gini coefficients. CPI is the consumer price index.  
Furthermore, all three surveys were conducted at different times of the year and so captured 
households at different stages of their annual income cycle. This is especially important for poor rural 
households whose agricultural incomes are seasonal. Therefore, while the surveys suggest that the share   5
of the population living below the national poverty line has risen from 46.3 percent in 1992 to 51.3 
percent in 1997, such detailed comparisons are, strictly speaking, inappropriate. However, most social 
indicators also worsened during this period, which corroborates a rise in poverty (World Bank 2006).  
Keeping the above limitations in mind, the surveys suggest that the rise in poverty has been 
concentrated in urban areas. This reflects rapid urbanization and slow industrial growth, which in turn 
explains the growth in private services typically associated with the informal economy. Conversely, the 
smaller rise in rural poverty may be attributed to agriculture’s stronger performance and slower rural 
population growth. Regardless of whether poverty rose over the last 10 years, the level of poverty in 
Kenya remains high. Half of the population’s incomes are insufficient to meet their basic needs. It is 
within this context of sluggish growth and severe poverty that the government designed its current 
strategy for economic recovery. 
Kenya’s Development Strategy 
The Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) outlines Kenya’s current development objectives, which include 
restoring economic growth, generating employment, and reducing poverty (GK  2003b). The strategy 
indicates the expected contributions of each sector and the policies required to realize growth (Table 1). 
Under the ERS, Kenya is expected to follow an industry-led growth path, encouraged by a series of policy 
interventions and public investments. The ERS includes both the formal and the informal economies 
when describing the importance of trade and industry, although the policies identified in the strategy are 
geared more toward the formal sector. These include reducing bureaucratic delays; computerizing 
immigration, customs, and the registration of companies; negotiating trade protocols; and encouraging 
research and development through tax incentives. Policies for the informal sector include establishing 
“incubator zones” for small enterprises and supplying these with supporting infrastructure. It is hoped that 
reducing production costs and providing an enabling environment for renewed investment will allow the 
trade sector to grow at 11 percent per year. High industrial growth will require higher levels of investment 
and imports.
1 As such, while the economy is projected to grow at around 6.0 percent per year during the 
recovery period, household consumption expenditure is expected to grow more slowly at 4.7 percent. 
Since this is still substantially higher than both population growth and the country’s past performance, it 
is expected that the level of poverty will have declined by at least five percentage points by 2007.  
Agriculture is expected to grow at 3 percent per year under the policies and investments outlined 
in the ERS. For crop agriculture, these include expanding extension services, improving rural roads and 
                                                      
1 The emphasis on industrial development may not necessarily imply that government spending should be biased toward this 
sector, since policies affecting private sector development and international trade may be less expensive to implement than 
infrastructure investments, yet cause significant increases in industrial growth.    6
irrigation, and strengthening farmer organizations. The livestock sector is also targeted through increased 
support for the dairy sector and improved animal health services. Emphasis is also placed on diversifying 
into new crops, such as cashew nuts, oil crops, and sorghum and cassava. Agricultural research is directed 
toward ensuring the potential of these new crops, while extension services facilitate the dissemination of 
new technologies to farmers. While it is hoped that these investments and policies can reverse the long-
term decline in agricultural productivity, the ERS is not particularly optimistic about the sector’s growth. 
This can be seen in the growth projection of 3 percent, which is simply a continuation of the sector’s 
long-term growth performance. Critically assessing this perspective is important given the current role of 
agriculture in the Kenyan economy.  
The Role of Agriculture  
Agriculture is the largest sector in the Kenyan economy, generating a quarter of gross domestic product 
(GDP) and two-fifths of export earnings (Kiringai, Thurlow, and Wanjala 2006). Unlike many other 
African countries, agricultural production in Kenya is relatively diverse, with export crops and higher-
value horticultural crops being as important as cereals and root and oil crops (see Table A1in the 
appendix). Exports include both traditional crops such as tea and coffee, as well as nontraditional crops 
such as cut flowers. By contrast, food crop production is dominated by maize and half of the country’s 
rice and wheat is imported. Agriculture and food processing are especially important activities for the 
rural economy, generating two-thirds of rural GDP. Given that 85 percent of the population lives in rural 
areas, this implies that agriculture is the primary source of income for a majority of households. 
Furthermore, while crop incomes are less important for urban households, the livestock sector still 
comprises a tenth of the informal economy, which in turn provides employment for poorer urban workers.  
Despite Kenya’s diversity, the agricultural sector has experienced mediocre growth over the last 
two decades, thus mirroring the weak overall performance of the economy. Agricultural production grew 
at 1 percent annually during the 1990s, driven by marginal improvements in crop yields or productivity 
(FAO 2006). However, this growth was well below the population growth rate of 2.5 percent. Although 
agricultural growth has doubled since 2000, this more recent period has been characterized by rapid area 
expansion and stagnant yields. There is also variation in the performance of individual sectors. On the one 
hand, horticulture and export crops have grown rapidly over the last decade, with the exception of coffee 
due to a collapse in international prices. On the other hand, cereals and root crops performed poorly 
during the 1990s, and while these sectors have subsequently expanded production, they have continued to 
experience pronounced declines in yields. Given Kenya’s growing population and land constraints, the 
key challenge for accelerating agricultural growth is overcoming the long-standing and widespread 
deterioration of farm productivity.     7
A number of studies have examined the determinants of agricultural productivity in Kenya.
2 
Falling yields during the early 1990s are attributed to the poor sequencing of market reforms and 
subsequent declines in the use of fertilizer and hybrid seeds (Karanja, Jayne, and Strasberg 1999; 
Odhiambo, Nyangito, and Nzuma 2004). Recent evidence suggests that fertilizer use is rising rapidly, 
although this is concentrated in favored agrological regions (Ariga, Jayne, and Nyoro 2006). Furthermore, 
increased population pressure in these favorable regions has caused migration to less-favored lands where 
existing technologies are often inappropriate (Nyoro and Jayne 1999). Funding for agricultural research is 
insufficient for the development of more appropriate seed varieties (Odhiambo, Nyangito, and Nzuma 
2004). Accordingly, increased spending on research and the provision of extension services is identified 
as a binding constraint to agricultural growth (Nyangito 1999). However, farmers’ knowledge of 
improved inputs is already widespread, suggesting that market development may be as important as 
extension (Nyoro, Wanzala, and Awour 2001). This is because higher input prices and lower output prices 
reduce the incentive for small-scale farmers to purchase fertilizer and hybrid seeds (Owuor 1999). 
Therefore, increasing market access by investing in roads is considered complementary to enhancing on-
farm technology. Furthermore, improved market access and commercialization are found to increase input 
use and yields for both food and cash crops (Strasberg et al. 1999). Productivity growth also depends on 
other forms of rural infrastructure, such as irrigation. Investments to improve water management have 
slowed dramatically over the last two decades, yet they remain fundamental for growth in some areas of 
the country (Odhiambo, Nyangito, and Nzuma 2004). Similarly, agricultural services that improve 
livestock management and disease control are found to have a positive impact on growth (Kabubo-
Mariara 2001; Karanja 2003). Finally, the literature identifies access to credit and working capital as a 
constraint for rural households (Nyoro, Wanzala, and Awour 2001; Kibaara 2006). Therefore, extensive 
empirical evidence exists to identify the types of investments needed to enhance agricultural productivity 
and accelerate rural growth in Kenya.  
Regional Differences in the Agricultural System 
A key finding from the literature on rural investment is that returns tend to vary across regions.
3 In order 
to capture how initial economic and environmental conditions influence the impact of rural investments, 
we divide Kenya into its three main agroecological regions: lowlands, midlands, and highlands (Figure 1). 
These regions include both rural areas and small towns. Major metropolitan centers are identified 
separately as cities and towns with more than 100,000 inhabitants. Although the five metropolitan centers 
in Kenya comprise less than 10 percent of the total population, they generate three-quarters of 
                                                      
2 See Odhiambo and Nyangito (2003) for a review of the literature. 
3 See Fan and Rao (2003) for a review of the literature, and Fan, Zhang, and Rao (2004) for a Ugandan case study.   8
nonagricultural production and more than half of national GDP (Appendix Table A1). Linkages to 
agriculture are mainly through demand for intermediate inputs for food processing, since urban 
households consume processed food rather than agricultural products, and since metropolitan areas 
produce a surplus of processed food (Kiringai, Thurlow, and Wanjala 2006).  
Figure 1. Kenya’s agrological zones and metropolitan centers 
 
Note: Lowland, midland, and highland refer to agroecological regions; metropolitan includes cities and towns with over 100,000 
residents. Agrological zones are district-level resolutions based on the dominant agrological zone by unweighted land area. 
Kenya’s agrological regions differ considerably (Table 3). The lowland region has the largest 
land area but is sparsely populated, although most of the population lives near the coast rather than in the 
interior. The lowland region generates less than 5 percent of national GDP, and average per capita 
incomes are low at US$132 per year. This is reflected in the region’s high poverty with three-fifths of the 
population falling below the official poverty line.
4 Despite better conditions along the coast, much of the 
lowland region is semi-arid with low average rainfalls. Access to assets and infrastructure are also poor, 
with low road densities, few cattle per capita, and long distances to piped water. Finally, only a quarter of 
farmers use fertilizer and improved seeds and few households engage in commercial agriculture, relying 
more on subsistence food production. In spite of its low level of development, agriculture generates less 
regional GDP in the lowlands than in either the midlands or highlands. However, pastoralists are a 
significant portion of the population, thus making the livestock sector an important component of the 
lowland economy. Therefore, given the poor initial conditions, improving food security is likely to be the 
key objective for lowland development. 
                                                      
4 The poverty line per person per year was defined in the 1997 WMS  as Kenyan shillings (Ksh) 21,848 (US$288) in rural 
areas and Ksh46,693 (US$615) in urban areas, both expressed in 2003 prices and unadjusted dollars.    9
Table 3. Regional characteristics 
 Agrological  region 




Area (sq. km)  384,759  161,942  43,824  8,391  598,916 
Population (1000s)  4,622  15,934  4,899  2,324  27,779 
Population density (per sq. km)  12  98  112  277  46 
GDP per capita (Ksh )  10,007  15,237  28,098  236,571  35,152 
GDP per capita (US $)  132  201  370  3,117  463 
Poverty incidence (P0) (%)  61.0  54.9  41.5  13.9  51.4 
   Depth (P1)  24.4  19.7  13.6  5.7  18.0 
   Severity (P2)  12.2  9.2  6.1  0.0  8.3 
Share of maize farmers (%)           
   Using fertilizer  22.2  81.4  86.0  -  64.9 
   Using improved seed varieties  26.4  87.5  82.8  -  67.7 
   Engaged in commercial activity  19.6  47.7  44.1  -  38.2 
Maize fertilizer use (kg per acre)  7.0  46.3  77.4  -  50.4 
Maize yield (Ksh per acre)  5,760  11,637  9,928  -  9,364 
Rainfall (mm per year)  563  1,061  815  -  839 
Distance to piped water (km)  10.4  9.1  4.0  -  8.0 
Road density (km per sq km)  0.12  0.50  0.88  1.85  0.30 
Number of cattle per household  1.0  1.5  2.2  0.0  0.8 
Source: Own calculations using 1999 population census (GK 2000), 1997 WMS (GK 2000 and the 2003 Kenyan social 
accounting matrix (Kiringai, Thurlow, and Wanjala 2006). Population-weighted regional averages are calculated using 
information from Ariga, Jayne, and Nyoro 2006; Karanja, Jayne, and Strasberg 1999; Owuor 1999; and Strasberg et al. 1999. 
The midlands is the main region for food crops, producing three-quarters of all cereals and root 
and oil crops in Kenya. Rainfall and maize yields are highest in this region, and a large share of farmers 
use fertilizers and hybrid seeds.
5 However, population density is eight times higher than in the lowlands 
and land scarcity is increasingly a constraint to growth (Nyoro and Jayne 1998). Livestock also forms an 
important part of the midlands economy, although, unlike the lowlands, dairy rather than cattle farming 
dominates because the midlands has better access to urban markets (Karanja 2003). Average incomes are 
higher and poverty is lower in the midlands than in the lowlands. However, the midlands’ large share of 
the population implies that almost two-thirds of the poor live in this region. The regions’ dependence on 
agricultural incomes and its favorable initial conditions suggest that reversing falling maize yields and 
encouraging cash crop production are key development objectives (Mose 1999). 
Finally, agrological conditions are also favorable in the highlands region, where maize yields and 
annual rainfall are relatively high. As in the midlands, there is widespread use of improved inputs, 
although only half of farmers engage in commercial agriculture. Unlike other regions, the highlands is 
                                                      
5 While the share of maize farmers using fertilizer and hybrid seeds is high in the midlands and highlands, their application 
rates are well below recommended levels. On average, fertilizer application among maize farmers in the lowlands, midlands, and 
highlands are 1.5, 72.8, and 56.3 percent of recommended levels, respectively.    10
heavily involved in higher-value horticulture and export crops and, despite its relatively small land area, 
is responsible for half of all production in these sectors. Accordingly, average incomes are higher and 
poverty is substantially lower in the highlands. Infrastructure is also more developed, with higher road 
densities and better access to water. Therefore, while the nature of investments may differ, the objectives 
for the highlands are similar to those of the midlands: encourage commercialization and increase cash 
crop production.  
In summary, while recent growth has been more promising, the performance of the Kenyan 
economy over the last decade has not been strong enough to generate significant reductions in poverty. 
On the contrary, there is evidence that both poverty and inequality may have worsened. Both agricultural 
and industrial growth has been erratic, with periods of expansion followed by rapid slowing and even 
stagnation. In this context, the government has devised a strategy for economic recovery through 
industry-led growth. The strategy is less optimistic for agriculture, which is projected to continue growing 
at its long-term growth rate. However, despite regional differences, the agricultural sector plays an 
important role throughout the Kenyan economy, both as a source of growth and as a provider of 
employment and incomes for a majority of the population. In light of the diverging expectations placed on 
agriculture and industry in the country’s development strategy, we now examine and contrast these 
alternative sources of growth and estimate their impact on poverty.   11
3.  SEARCHING FOR SOURCES OF POVERTY-REDUCING GROWTH 
In this chapter we use an economy-wide model to examine the impact of alternative sources of growth on 
poverty and inequality. Three sets of scenarios are presented. In the first scenario the model is calibrated 
to replicate the level and structure of growth that Kenya experienced over the last five years. Not only 
does this baseline scenario estimate the level of poverty that is likely to be achieved by 2015, but it also 
provides a counterfactual scenario for subsequent simulations. The second set of scenarios compares the 
poverty outcomes resulting from accelerating agricultural and industrial growth. These scenarios broadly 
assess the industry-led growth currently being advocated. Finally, a third set of scenarios looks within 
agriculture and estimates the poverty impact of accelerating growth in food crops and livestock, and 
export crops. These scenarios consider the effects of diversifying into nontraditional crops versus 
expanding domestic food production. These scenarios are designed to allow for a scale-neutral 
comparison of the poverty-reducing effects of alternative sectoral growth paths, without taking the cost of 
accelerating growth into account. This section therefore does not address how growth in different sectors 
can be achieved, which is the focus of chapter 4.  
Modeling Alternative Growth Strategies and Their Impact on Poverty 
Empirically estimating the relative importance of agriculture and industry in pro-poor growth requires an 
analytical method that isolates the effects of growth on poverty, while also incorporating the effects of 
structural change on the growth–poverty relationship. Accordingly, this section describes the dynamic 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) and microsimulation model that we use to analyze growth and 
distributional change in Kenya. Since the model and its database are described in detail in Kiringai and 
Thurlow (2006) and Kiringai, Thurlow, and Wanjala (2006), this section focuses on the key features of 
the model. 
Our first objective is to capture how agriculture and industry contribute to economic growth. An 
important determinant is the growth linkages between each sector and the rest of the economy. Both own 
and marketed consumption (forward) and production (backward) linkages are captured in the CGE model, 
whose production functions allow producers to generate demand for both factors and intermediate inputs 
when maximizing profits. The model is calibrated to a highly disaggregated 2002 social accounting 
matrix (SAM) that distinguishes between 212 productive activities (53 sectors in four subnational 
regions) and 53 commodities (see Table A2 in the appendix). The regions include the three main agro-
ecological zones (lowlands, midlands, and highlands) and the major metropolitan areas. However, while 
regional production structures and technologies are captured in the model, regionally produced 
commodities are traded in national and international markets. The model captures import competition and   12
export opportunities by allowing producers and consumers to shift between domestic and foreign markets 
depending on changing relative prices. The model identifies 39 factors of production, including region-
specific capital, land, and labor. Labor is also disaggregated by gender and occupational skill categories. 
Both capital and labor are disaggregated across rural, urban informal, and urban formal sectors, forming 
the basis for the nesting of factor demand. Land and skilled labor are fully employed, earn flexible returns 
under fixed supply, and are mobile across sectors within regions. Unskilled labor faces unemployment, 
earns a fixed real wage, and is mobile across both sectors and regions. By contrast, existing capital is 
immobile earning flexible activity-specific returns. This detailed specification of production and factor 
markets allows the model to capture the changing scale and technology of production across sectors and 
regions, and therefore, the way that changes in Kenya’s growth structure influence its distribution of 
incomes.  
Our second objective is to capture the contribution of agriculture and industry to household 
livelihoods. Income and expenditure patterns vary considerably across households, especially across 
regions and rural and urban areas. These differences are important for distributional change, since the 
incomes generated by agriculture and industry will accrue to different households depending on their 
location and factor endowments. To capture these differences, the model distinguishes between 70 
representative households, each of which is an aggregation of a group of households in the 1997 Welfare 
Monitoring Survey (WMSIII). Households in the model earn monetary and nonmonetary incomes, and, 
after paying taxes, use their disposable income to consume commodities. In order to retain as much 
information on households’ income and expenditure patterns as possible, the CGE model is linked to a 
microsimulation module based on WMSIII. Endogenous changes in commodity consumption for each 
aggregate household in the CGE model are used to adjust the level of commodity expenditure of the 
corresponding households in the survey. Real consumption levels are then recalculated in the survey and 
standard poverty measures are estimated using this updated expenditure measure.  
The model makes a number of assumptions about how the Kenyan economy maintains 
macroeconomic balance. These “closure rules” concern the foreign or current account, the government or 
public sector account, and the savings–investment account. For the current account, a flexible exchange 
rate maintains a fixed level of foreign savings. This assumption implies that Kenya cannot increase 
foreign borrowing but has to generate export earnings in order to pay for food or capital imports. While 
this assumption realistically limits the degree of import competition in the domestic market, it also 
underlines the importance of the agricultural and industrial export sectors. For the government account, 
public expenditures are exogenously determined and the government adjusts private tax rates in order to 
maintain a fixed fiscal deficit. For the savings–investment account, real investment adjusts to changes in 
savings (savings-driven investment). These assumptions allow the model to capture the negative   13
crowding-out effects of public expenditures on private consumption according to the current tax-
incidence. 
Finally, the CGE model is recursive dynamic, which means that key parameters in the model are 
updated each period based on previous period results. The model is run over the 13 years (2003–15) with 
each equilibrium period representing a single year. During this time the model captures exogenous 
demographic and technological change. Changes in the population, labor supply, human capital, and total 
factor productivity (TFP) are based on observed trends and available literature.
6 By contrast, capital 
accumulation is endogenous, with previous-period investment generating new capital stock. Although the 
allocation of new capital is influenced by each sector’s initial share of gross operating surplus, the final 
allocation depends on depreciation and sector profit-rate differentials. Sectors with above-average returns 
in the previous period receive a larger share of the new capital stock in the current period. Although the 
model runs during 2003–15, deviations in sectoral growth rates and public investment take place during 
2006–15. 
In summary, the model captures distributional and poverty impacts by (1) disaggregating growth 
across regions and sectors; (2) capturing employment effects through factor markets and price effects 
through commodity markets; and (3) translating these two effects onto each household in the survey, 
according to its unique factor endowment and income and expenditure patterns. This allows for the model 
to capture the poverty impacts associated with growth in agriculture and industry in Kenya. 
Poverty Reduction Under the Current Growth Path 
Under the baseline scenario, Kenya is assumed to grow at an annual rate of 3 percent (Table 4). This is 
slightly higher than what was experienced during the previous seven years, but is consistent with the 
acceleration of growth since 2000. This aggregate level of growth is achieved by calibrating sectoral 
growth rates to track recent trends.
7 Therefore, assuming past trends persist, agriculture in the model 
grows more rapidly than overall GDP growth at 3.3 percent, driven by the strong performance of cash 
crops and livestock. By contrast, food crops grow slowly and food processing in the manufacturing sector 
stagnates. The combined growth in food production is below the population growth rate of 1.9 percent, 
implying that national per capita food production falls. However, population growth in rural areas is 
lower than in urban areas, meaning that the food deficit falls more heavily on urban households. 
                                                      
6 See Table A3 in the appendix for the assumptions made in calibrating the dynamics of the model. 
7 The sectoral growth target is attained by exogenously increasing TFP to supplement endogenously determined labor supply 
and capital accumulation. The overall required TFP growth in the baseline scenario is 0.7 percent per year for 2006–15. This is 
higher than the –0.96 percent overall TFP growth estimated by Ndulu and O’Connell (2003) for 1995–2000, but lower than the 
1.7 percent from Onjala (2002) for 1986–1995.    14
Table 4. Growth outcomes under growth scenarios 
Average annual growth rate (%) 




















GDP factor cost  100.0  2.6 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0  4.0  4.0
Agriculture  23.5 3.3 3.0 2.8 7.0 7.2  6.5 7.4
Cereals    2.9 2.1 2.5 3.3 4.3 5.7  2.6 1.9
Roots & tubers  3.1  0.9 0.9 1.4 3.0 7.9  0.9  -1.2
Horticulture 3.7  3.4 4.0 4.3 7.5 21.2  4.2  -0.1
Export crops  6.1  5.5 4.0 1.8 10.5 -11.0  5.5  16.3
Livestock  6.6 2.8 3.0 3.6 6.0 3.1  11.6 3.7
Industry  21.2 2.1 2.8 6.4 2.3 2.3  3.0 1.9
Manufacturing  12.4 0.8 2.2 6.5 1.2 1.2  2.4 0.1
Food  processing  4.2 0.2 1.0 3.4 1.1 0.7  1.8 0.6
Light industry  2.0  1.7 1.5 6.4 -0.1 0.0  1.3  -1.1
Heavy  industry  6.2 0.3 3.2 8.2 1.6 1.8  3.1 0.2
Private  services  42.7 3.2 3.3 3.9 3.5 3.4  3.5 3.5
Public  services  12.6 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0  2.0 2.0
GDP factor cost  -  - 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0  4.0  4.0
Labor employment  -  - 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9  0.9  0.9
Capital and land  -  - 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.4  1.4  1.5
TFP -  - 0.7 1.5 1.7 1.7  1.7  1.7
Source: Kenyan CGE/ microsimulation model and observed trends from national accounts (GK 2006) 
Note: Food crops include all edible crops (such as cereals, roots, pulses); cash crops include both export and industrial crops 
(such as cut flowers, tea, horticulture, tobacco); light industry includes textiles, clothing, and wood and paper products; and heavy 
industry includes chemicals, petroleum, and machinery and equipment. 
The baseline scenario assumes a more balanced structure of growth than was experienced during 
1997–2004. Manufacturing grows at 2.2 percent per year during 2006–15. This acceleration of 
manufacturing growth is in line with more recent trends and the observed investment growth. Investment 
growth generates particularly strong demand for both heavy industry and construction, whose production 
and imports expand accordingly. Services also continue along past trends, with private and public services 
growing at 3.3 and 2.0 percent per year respectively.  
While the economy grows at 3 percent per year, household consumption expenditure rises by 
only 2.8 percent per year or 0.9 percent in per capita terms. This is higher than the per capita consumption 
growth experienced during the 1990s, and reverses previous increases in poverty. Under the baseline 
scenario, the national incidence of poverty falls from 51.3 percent in 2003 to 48.1 percent in 2015 (Table 
5). However, this aggregate decline hides the continued rise in urban poverty that began during the 1990s. 
The share of the urban population falling below the national poverty line increases from 47.6 percent to   15
49.5 percent. By contrast, rural poverty falls by more than four percentage points. This implies that, if the 
current growth path is maintained, urban poverty will be higher than rural poverty by 2015.
8  
















      Final year poverty rate in 2015 (%) 
National  incidence  (P0)  100.0 51.3 48.1  46.0  38.7  39.3  41.6 39.9 
   Rural  84.3  51.9  47.8  45.8 36.7 37.4  40.1  37.9 
   Urban  15.7  47.6  49.5  46.8  48.6  47.9  48.8  49.8 
   Lowland  6.3  61.0  60.0  57.6  55.0  53.6  58.7  54.3 
   Midland  59.5  54.7  51.8  49.8  40.0  40.8  44.1  41.9 
   Highland  22.2  41.4  34.3  31.4 24.9 26.1  25.9  25.2 
   Metropolitan  11.9  47.1  48.3  47.2  47.9  47.0  47.9  48.7 
National  depth  (P1)  - 17.9 18.0  16.6  12.8  13.4  15.0 13.1 
National  severity  (P2)  - 8.2 8.7  7.9  5.7  6.1  7.1 5.9 
     Poverty-growth  elasticities,  2006-15 
National  incidence  (P0)  -  -  -0.17  -0.51 -2.20 -2.13  -1.58  -1.90 
   Rural incidence  -  -  -0.22  -0.45  -2.66  -2.46  -1.90  -2.36 
      Rural gap   -  -  -0.16  -0.57  -4.22  -3.72  -2.51  -4.32 
      Rural squared gap   -  -  -0.11  -0.57  -5.32  -4.53  -2.84  -5.66 
   Urban incidence   -  -  0.10  -0.78  -0.23  -0.66  -0.18  0.15 
Source: Kenyan CGE-microsimulation model 
Notes: The microsimulation module is based on the 1997 WMS (GK 2000) thus initial poverty rates in the model are those for 
1997. The official basic needs poverty line is set at Ksh1, 239 (rural) (US$21) and Ksh2, 648 (urban) (US$45) per adult per 
month (1997 prices). 
The baseline scenario suggests that not all households will benefit equally under Kenya’s current 
growth path. One measure of the effectiveness of growth at reducing poverty is the poverty-growth 
elasticity (Ravallion and Chen 2003). Under the baseline scenario, the poverty-growth elasticity for the 
national incidence of poverty is –0.38 (cf. Table 5). This means that every 1.00 percent growth in per 
capita GDP leads to a 0.38 percent decline in the poverty rate.
9 This elasticity incorporates the effects of a 
changing distribution of incomes and is therefore a dynamic measure of the growth–poverty relationship. 
The model is also used to estimate the economy-wide growth rate that would be required to achieve the 
first MDG of halving 1992 poverty by 2015 (that is, 22.2 percent). Assuming all sectors grow 
proportionately, the required annual GDP growth rate is 10.3 percent during 2006–15. Since few 
countries have achieved and sustained such high growth, Kenya will inevitably fall short of this 
development goal. However, these calculations assume that growth will continue to be as effective at 
reducing poverty. Therefore, while accelerating economic growth is undoubtedly a most pressing 
                                                      
8 Kenya has separate expenditure-based poverty lines for rural and urban areas, reflecting the higher cost of living for urban 
households. Higher urban poverty therefore does not mean that nominal rural incomes are higher than urban incomes. 
Furthermore, this study uses expenditure-based poverty and so does not capture asset deprivation. 
9 Note that this is a percent decline rather than a percentage point decline.   16
objective, the government should also seek ways to ensure that a greater number of Kenyans participate in 
the growth process. With this objective in mind, the next section compares growth in agriculture and 
industry-led growth.  
Comparing Agriculture and Industry-Led Growth 
The impact of agricultural and industrial growth on poverty is examined by accelerating the overall GDP 
growth rate from its current 3 percent to 4 percent per year. Two scenarios are presented in which the 
source of this additional growth differs. In the agriculture-led scenario, growth in the agricultural and 
food processing sectors is increased, while additional growth in the industry-led scenario comes from 
mining, nonfood manufacturing, and construction. Although the two scenarios generate the same overall 
GDP growth rate, the required increases in sectoral growth are different due to their relative sizes and 
growth linkages. For instance, under the agriculture-led scenario, the growth rate of agriculture increases 
from 3.3 percent; under the baseline scenario, it increases to 7 percent, while manufacturing growth 
declines slightly (Table 4). Falling manufacturing growth indicates that resource competition with the 
agricultural sector outweighs the positive income effects caused by faster agriculture-led growth. 
Conversely, under the industry-led scenario, manufacturing growth increases from 2.2 to 6.5 percent per 
year, while agricultural growth decreases slightly.  
By assumption, faster agricultural growth in the agriculture-led scenario is driven by food and 
export crops, livestock, and forestry and fishing. However, the model suggests that export crops would 
grow faster than other agricultural subsectors due to better foreign market opportunities and hence smaller 
declines in domestic prices after production has expanded. Agricultural production directly raises incomes 
among rural households, and it indirectly raises real incomes among urban and rural households through 
reduced food prices. Therefore, the incidence of both rural and urban poverty declines, although it is more 
heavily concentrated among rural households (Table 5). Rising incomes and expenditures are particularly 
pronounced in the poorest populations, as seen by the larger decline in both the depth and severity of 
poverty. Therefore, while all households benefit from faster agricultural growth, it is the poorer rural 
households that benefit the most. 
By contrast, the benefits of faster nonfood manufacturing growth in the formal and informal 
sectors under the industry-led scenario are more concentrated among the less-poor households. While 
faster growth in the labor-intensive light industry and construction sectors does benefit poorer urban 
households, poverty under the industry-led scenario declines only slightly more than under agriculture-led 
growth. This is because poor urban households are less likely to be employed in the more formal mining 
and heavy manufacturing sectors and hence only benefit indirectly through higher economy-wide growth 
in the informal service sectors. However, the overall effect of accelerating growth in light manufacturing   17
and construction and the spillover into services is enough to ensure that the informal economy grows 
alongside the formal economy. This drives the decline in urban poverty but limits any positive spillovers 
to rural households.    
One of the arguments put forward by the proponents of agriculture is that the sector has sufficient 
scale to generate significant economy-wide growth (Diao et al. 2006). For example, in the case of Kenya, 
agriculture and food processing generate 28.1 percent of GDP, while mining and nonfood industry 
generates 17.5 percent. Therefore, since a 1.0 percent increase in agricultural GDP is larger than a 1.0 
percent increase in industrial GDP, it might seem trivial to suggest that agricultural growth is better at 
reducing poverty. However, the above scenarios are “scale-neutral” since the same aggregate GDP 
growth rate was targeted in each of the scenarios. Therefore, the results suggest that it is not only 
agriculture’s large share of GDP that determines its ability to generate broad-based poverty reduction, but 
also its particular ability to generate employment and incomes among the poor population.  
Agriculture’s proponents also emphasize the sector’s strong growth linkages to the rest of the 
economy. Agricultural growth generates growth in both rural and urban areas, although it is more strongly 
linked to the urban informal economy than to the more formal manufacturing sectors. Beyond the 
competition over resources described earlier, the weaker linkages between agricultural and formal 
manufacturing growth is primarily due to rural demand patterns. Rural households are the direct 
beneficiaries of agricultural growth, yet they demand fewer formal sector goods than urban households. 
Therefore, when agriculture grows more rapidly it does not generate much demand for formal 
manufacturing goods, although it does benefit the urban economy by lowering food prices. However, 
despite some negative spillover effects, agriculture has stronger growth linkages than industry. 
Agriculture’s GDP multipliers are larger than those of industry and similar to those of services (Table 6). 
Furthermore, agriculture’s income multipliers are larger than those of services, suggesting that 
agriculture-led growth is better at generating employment and raising incomes. The CGE model’s results 
also indicate that agriculture’s economy-wide growth linkages are more pro-poor. Under the agriculture-
led scenario, the national incidence of poverty falls to 38.7 percent, compared to 46.0 percent under the 
industry-led scenario. This difference implies that there would be 2.5 million fewer people living in 
poverty by 2015. Although the additional 1 percent growth is insufficient to halve poverty by 2015, 
accelerating agricultural growth from 3.3 to 7.0 percent is enough to achieve half of the MDG, whereas 
the equivalent industrial growth meets only a fifth of the target. This means that agriculture-led growth is 
more than twice as effective at reducing poverty as industry-led growth. This can be seen by comparing 
the poverty-growth elasticity of the agriculture-led scenario with that of the industry-led scenario (Table 
5).    18
Table 6. Sectoral growth multipliers 
  Multiplier after increasing sectoral output by 1 shilling  
 Output  GDP  Income 
Agriculture      
   Cereals   4.85  2.39  2.18 
   Roots & tubers  5.21  2.67  2.33 
   Horticulture  5.15  2.68  2.35 
   Export crops  5.16  2.62  2.32 
   Livestock  4.79  2.54  2.15 
Industry      
   Food processing  4.05  1.76  1.55 
   Light industry  4.25  1.87  1.67 
   Heavy industry  3.98  1.87  1.76 
   Construction and energy  4.59  2.11  1.81 
Services      
   Trade  4.63  2.24  1.87 
   Transport  4.78  2.32  2.03 
   Other private services  4.44  2.40  1.99 
   Public services  4.78  2.50  2.13 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 2003 Kenyan social accounting matrix (Kiringai, Thurlow, and Wanjala 2006) 
Note: Multipliers are unconstrained, thus assuming perfectly elastic supply and fixed prices.  
Although agricultural growth is more effective than industrial growth at reducing national 
poverty, both sources of growth favor different groups and regions within the country. Faster industrial 
growth raises the poverty-growth elasticity in urban and metropolitan areas where households generate 
most of their incomes from nonfarm activities. Conversely, agricultural growth is most effective at 
reducing poverty in the regions where farm incomes are most important. Unlike industry, however, 
agricultural growth reduces poverty in all regions and among the country’s poorest population (that is, the 
gap between elasticities is even larger for the depth and severity of poverty). These distributional effects 
are more clearly seen using national growth incidence curves (Figure 2). These curves show the additional 
per capita expenditure growth for each percentile of the population ranked according to expenditure 
levels. Under the balanced growth scenario the curve is always positive, implying that poverty is 
unambiguously declining. Furthermore, the curve is horizontal, indicating that per capita expenditure 
increases equally for both high- and low-income households. This means that inequality remains 
unchanged. By contrast, the growth incidence curve under industry-led growth is upward sloping, 
indicating that expenditure for low-income households rises less than that for higher-income households. 
While industrial growth exacerbates inequality, the opposite is true for agricultural growth whose curve is 
downward sloping. Perhaps most important, however, the growth incidence curve for agriculture-led 
growth is always above that of industry-led growth, implying that all households are likely to benefit 
more from agricultural growth. This is because industrial growth is more capital-intensive and 
investment-driven, thus leading to lower growth rates in private consumption spending.    19
















































Source: Kenyan CGE-microsimulation model 
Note: Per capita expenditure growth is in addition to that experienced under the baseline counterfactual scenario.  
This set of scenarios finds that differences in the sectoral structure of growth can have significant 
implications for poverty reduction. Increasing the rate of growth may be insufficient to significantly 
reduce poverty if growth generates distributional changes that isolate the poor from the growth process. 
The results for the industry-led scenario are similar to the projected structure of growth under the 
Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS). Therefore, given its focus on industrial growth, the ERS may 
produce poverty outcomes similar to the industry-led scenario presented above. Moreover, industry-led 
growth worsens income inequality, which is already high in Kenya. However, while agricultural growth 
may be more pro-poor than industrial growth, no single source of growth is equally effective at reducing 
poverty in all areas and regions of the country. Nor should the benefits of agricultural or industrial growth 
be seen to affect only rural and urban households respectively. In the case of Kenya, industrial growth 
linkages generate positive spillovers to the rural nonfarm economy, while agriculture’s growth linkages 
raise real urban incomes, especially in the informal economy. Agricultural and industrial growth are 
therefore not mutually exclusive. However, agricultural growth should receive greater emphasis in 
Kenya’s growth strategy if the country is to achieve more equitable outcomes. Accordingly, the rest of 
this paper focuses on accelerating growth within the agricultural sector.  
Decomposing the Contribution of Agriculture 
In this section, we look inside Kenya’s agricultural development strategy and decompose the potential 
contribution of different agricultural subsectors to growth and poverty reduction (food crops, livestock, 
and export crops). The effectiveness of these subsectors in reducing poverty is again examined by raising 
the overall GDP growth rate from 3 to 4 percent through increases in TFP. Three scenarios are presented   20
in this section: (1) accelerated growth in food crops, (2) accelerated growth in the livestock and dairy 
sectors, and (3) accelerated growth in export crops. In these simulations, food crops include maize, 
sorghum, and millet; export crops include traditional and nontraditional crops such as tea, cotton, coffee, 
and horticulture; and livestock includes beef, poultry, dairy, and other livestock-related activities. 
Understanding the contribution of these subsectors to poverty-reducing growth is especially important for 
Kenya, whose agricultural growth in recent years has been characterized by a more rapid expansion in 
export crops and livestock but more modest growth in food crops and processing.  
Agriculture’s overall growth rate under the food crop scenario increases from 3.0 to 7.2 percent in 
order to generate the additional 1 percent in overall GDP growth (Table 4). The additional agricultural 
growth is higher under the export crop scenario, and the effect of rapidly rising agricultural exports is an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, which undermines the competitiveness of other agricultural and 
manufacturing exports. Manufacturing growth therefore declines significantly under the export crop 
scenario. However, despite improved agricultural productivity, rapid growth in food crops creates greater 
competition for agricultural resources, especially land and rural labor, and this reduces the availability of 
these resources for other agricultural sectors. Accordingly, export crop growth reverses from 4 percent 
under the baseline scenario to –11 percent under the food crop scenario. Therefore, there is definite 
competition over resources between food and export crops. Shifts in the composition of agricultural 
growth also influence how households benefit from growth. These differences remain small at the 
national level, with food crop growth generating slightly better poverty outcomes than growth in export 
crops (Figure 3). However, at the subnational level there are more significant differences, with the 
lowland and midland regions benefiting more from food crop expansion than the highlands, which in turn 
benefits more from export crops.  
Accelerating livestock production under the livestock scenario does not lead to pronounced 
resource competition with other agricultural sectors. Growth in the dairy sector favors the highland 
region. However, the impact on poverty resulting from accelerated livestock growth is smaller than under 
either food or export crop growth, especially for the depth and severity of poverty. This is evident in the 
relative sizes of the poverty-growth elasticities (Table 6). While all three scenarios have large elasticities, 
it is food crop production that strengthens the growth–poverty relationship the most. However, while this 
is true for the lowland and midland regions, it is not true for the highland region, where the growth–
poverty relationship is weakened by an expansion of food crops (that is, at the expense of cash crops). By 
contrast, households in the highland region benefit more under the cash crop and livestock scenarios, 
albeit at the expense of lowland growth and poverty. Therefore, while the previous section found that 
agricultural growth is more pro-poor than industrial growth, there is still trade-offs within agriculture that 
can result in significant distributional changes.   21







































Source: Kenyan CGE-microsimulation model 
 
In summary, a growth strategy that seeks to share the benefits of growth among households 
throughout the country cannot focus agricultural growth only in certain sectors. Such a narrow approach 
may successfully reduce poverty in the short term as incomes rise for households in those regions with 
appropriate conditions. However, national poverty reduction would taper off, since households in the less-
favored regions are effectively isolated from the growth process. This is especially true for the lagging 
lowland region. Promoting only certain sectors without considering distributional change and regional 
differences can effectively exclude sections of the population from the benefits of growth. It should also 
be noted that the growth rates that would be required from export crops and horticulture were they solely 
responsible for generating additional GDP growth are unrealistically high at about 10 percent per year. 
Therefore, over and above the need to generate broad-based agricultural growth to ensure regional equity, 
it is unlikely that a strategy based on a single sector will be able to generate the levels of growth necessary 
to significantly raise growth and reduce poverty.    22
4.  INVESTING IN AGRICULTURAL GROWTH 
Public Spending and Agricultural Productivity 
So far we have identified agriculture as an effective source of poverty-reducing growth. Next we consider 
how public investments can be used to accelerate agricultural growth, taking into account fiscal 
implications. Although there are many necessary interventions, there is some consensus within the 
empirical evidence. Given the constraints to area expansion in Kenya, policies should focus on raising 
agricultural productivity (Nyoro and Jayne 1999). The empirical evidence suggests that a number of 
binding constraints have lowered agricultural productivity. These include poor access to credit and farm 
capital (Ekborm 1998); low usage of farm inputs, especially fertilizer (Odhiambo, Nyangito, and Nzuma 
2004; Nyoro and Jayne 1999); and a lack of technical knowledge among smallholders that has limited the 
use of pesticides and other farm inputs (Evenson and Mwabu 1998; Nyangito 1999). These constraints 
emphasize the need for extension services over and above rural education, whose relationship to 
agricultural productivity is found to be relatively weak (Odhiambo, Nyangito, and Nzuma 2004). Most 
important, increased investment in agricultural research has a strong and positive relationship to 
agricultural productivity. Supporting research is therefore especially important in Kenya, where increased 
land density has forced smallholder farmers to transfer inappropriate technologies into new environments 
(Nyoro and Jayne 1999). Taken together, improved inputs and technologies can reverse the long-run 
decline in the country’s agricultural productivity. Finally, lowering Kenya’s high transport costs through 
improvements in rural infrastructure, especially roads, is not only important for improving access to input 
and output markets, but it is also found to indirectly enhance the productivity of nontraded crops.  
Empirical studies have found that government spending on agriculture has a positive impact on 
agricultural productivity (Odhiambo, Nyangito, Nzuma 2004). However, agricultural spending has fallen 
dramatically, having peaked around 10 percent in the early 1990s and dropping below 5 percent in more 
recent years (Figure 4). Government projections indicate that agricultural spending will gradually increase 
its share of budget allocations over the next five years but its share will remain around 5 percent. This 
mirrors the emphasis of the country’s current development strategy but contrasts with the 10 percent 
expenditure target that the government committed to under the Maputo Declaration. Expenditure on roads 
has increased slightly, but while it is impossible to isolate rural roads from the figure, it is reasonable to 
conclude that total expenditure on agriculture and rural infrastructure has declined over the last decade. 
In this chapter, we consider the impact and fiscal implications of increasing agricultural spending 
to 10 percent of the budget. Drawing on recommendations from the Kenyan literature, we explore two 
potential areas of investment within the agricultural sector. These include raising expenditure on research 
and extension and on irrigation and water management. Although the Maputo Declaration refers   23
specifically to agricultural spending, we also examine the impact of increasing investment in road 
infrastructure and strengthening market development. To estimate these impacts, we extend the CGE 
model to capture the relationship between spending and agricultural productivity. 
































































Source: IMF statistical appendixes (various years) and projections from the Government of Kenya (various sources cited in 
Akroyd and Smith 2007) 
Modeling the Impact of Rural Investments 
Modeling the impact of investments takes place in two stages. First, a set of equations is specified that 
captures the channels through which specific investments affect agricultural productivity. The initial 
estimates of key parameters are drawn from the literature. Second, the productivity equations are 
integrated within the CGE model to capture the impact of increasing agricultural productivity on regional 
production and incomes, relative prices, resource allocations, and market constraints.  
The impact of investments on productivity is modeled using a set of nested linear equations. As 
described earlier, the CGE model contains production functions for each sector in each region. Equation 1 
is a production function in which producers combine labor L and capital K in order to produce total output 
Q in year t. Intermediate inputs are combined with factor value-added under a fixed share Leontief 
specification (that is, cheaper inputs reduce the cost of production but cannot substitute for factor inputs). 
  ( ) , tt t t QF L K α = .  (1) 
As described earlier, demand for factor and commodity inputs is determined endogenously in the 
CGE model according to changes in relative factor and commodity prices. Rural investments affect the 

















,  (2) 
where R is the length of roads in kilometers, I is land under irrigation in hectares, and E
e is 
government expenditure on research and extension (R&E) in millions of Kenyan shillings. The β  
coefficients show the percentage change in TFP resulting from a 1 percent change in each of these 
investments. The right-hand terms of equation 2 are a combination of two stock variables (roads and 
irrigation) and a flow variable (R&E). We translate changes in public expenditures on roads and irrigation 
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where R
e and I
e are government expenditure on roads and irrigation in Kenyan shillings, and r and 
i are the unit costs of building one kilometer of feeder roads and one hectare of irrigation.  




e); (2) initial capital stocks (R and I); (3) investment elasticities 
(β ); and (4) unit costs for stock variables (r and i). The values used are based on estimates from the 
literature and government sources. District-level road stocks from government sources were used to 
compile region-level stocks. Irrigation stocks in each region were derived from information on the 
national share of irrigated land for each crop weighted by regional cropping patterns. Unit cost 
information is taken from government sources, which estimate the cost of one kilometer of feeder roads at 
Ksh59,000 (US$750) and one hectare of irrigation at Ksh79,000 (US$1,000) both in 2002 prices.
10 It is 
assumed that these unit costs are the same throughout the country.  
Estimates for the productivity-investment elasticities are based on econometrically estimated 
coefficients for Uganda (Fan, Zhang, and Rao 2004). These coefficients are allocated to crop categories or 
sectors (Table 7). It is assumed that elasticities are the same across regions. However, the returns to 
expenditures vary by region according to economic structures and initial expenditures and capital stocks. 
Of course, elasticities are not strictly speaking transferable across countries. In light of Kenya’s own 
circumstances, we use a lower elasticity for R&E than was found for Uganda because there is evidence 
that extension services in Kenya are not as effective as elsewhere (Gautam and Anderson 1998). We use a 
higher initial elasticity for roads because Kenya has a more extensive road network than Uganda, and 
                                                      
10 As with irrigation, unit costs include workers’ wages and materials.   25
hence percentage stock changes are substantially larger in absolute terms. Since the returns to irrigation 
were not estimated in Uganda, we assume an initial elasticity for irrigation stocks. However, given the 
uncertainty associated with each of these elasticities, we conduct sensitivity analysis assuming a 25 
percent confidence interval around initial estimates. These are shown in the table as upper and lower 
bounds. 
Table 7. Elasticities in the productivity-investment function 
Investment type  Productivity-investment elasticity  Sectors affected 
 Uganda  Lower  Initial  Upper   
Roads   0.139  0.113  0.150  0.188  Crops, livestock, food processing, and trade 
Irrigation    -  0.150 0.200 0.250  Crops  (excl.  highlands) 
Extension  0.189  0.113  0.150  0.188  Crops (excl. export crops), and livestock 
Source: Uganda estimates from Fan, Zhang, and Rao (2004). Upper and lower estimates are used for sensitivity analysis and are 
based on a 25 percent confidence interval around the initial estimate.  
Government expenditures are already captured inside the CGE model, which tracks how revenues 
are raised through various taxes and then allocated across regions and government functions (health, 
education, agriculture, and roads, for example). District-level expenditure information from government 
sources and labor income from the WMSIII (GK, 2000) were used to disaggregate the government sector 
by function and region. The growth rate of public expenditures in the CGE model is determined 
exogenously for each government function. In the baseline scenario, all expenditures grew at the same 2 
percent annual growth rate. However, in the investment scenarios that follow we increase the growth rate 
of each expenditure item in order to achieve expenditure share targets by 2015. In other words, additional 
agricultural spending is not at the expense of other expenditure items, but through higher overall spending 
by the government. The revenues needed to finance this additional spending are generated by increasing 
direct taxes on household incomes so that the government budget remains unchanged. 
Increasing Spending on Irrigation and Extension  
The literature identifies irrigation and water management, and R&E as areas where additional investments 
are needed to raise agricultural productivity. The first two investment scenarios assess these investment 
options. In determining the financial resource envelope for each scenario, we start with the initial share of 
total agricultural spending, which was equal to 4.8 percent of government spending in 2002 (Figure 5). 
This share comprised 0.2 percent on irrigation and 1.3 percent on R&E; the remaining 3.5 percent was on 
other areas of agriculture. Since all expenditure areas grew at 2 percent per year under the baseline 
scenario, there was no change in the final composition of total expenditure. However, in the irrigation 
scenario we gradually increase the share of government expenditure on irrigation from 0.2 to 2.7 percent 
during 2006–15. In the extension scenario we also increase the share of R&E spending by 2.7 percent so   26
that agricultural spending as a whole is 10 percent of total spending. This scenario is equivalent to 
meeting the expenditure target identified in the Maputo Declaration. It is important to note that the 
scenarios are cumulative, meaning that the extension scenario includes the effects of the irrigation 
scenario. Therefore, the counterfactual for the extension scenario is the irrigation rather than the baseline 
scenario. 
Figure 5. Final agricultural expenditure shares under investment scenarios, 2015 
























































Source: Kenya CGE/ microsimulation model 
Note: Outcomes are cumulative (for example, roads include the expenditures from irrigation and extension).  
Increasing irrigation’s share of total spending from 0.2 to 2.9 percent is equivalent to increasing 
the share of irrigable land under irrigation from 5.3 percent to 19.3 percent during 2006–15.
11 Under the 
baseline scenario, the share of land under irrigation would have risen to 6.9 percent. So in the irrigation 
scenario we are more than doubling the amount of irrigated land, or adding 180,000 hectares over and 
above the 33,000 hectares expected if irrigation stays at 0.2 percent of total spending. The impact of 
increasing irrigation investment is an acceleration of agricultural growth from 3 percent per year under 
the baseline scenario to 3.8 percent under the irrigation scenario (Table 8). Additional spending on R&E 
in the extension scenario accelerates agricultural growth by a further 1.5 percent per year. This comes 
from increasing the share of R&E expenditure from 1.2 to 4.0 percent of total spending. These two 
scenarios suggest that increasing the share of government spending on agriculture to 10 percent would 
allow agriculture to reach an average growth rate of 5.3 percent during 2006–15.  
                                                      
11 We assume all land under cultivation in the lowlands and midlands is irrigable. We exclude the highlands since Kenya’s 
agricultural research institute excludes irrigation trials in this region due its more favorable rainfall patterns.   27
Table 8. Growth outcomes under investment scenarios 
  Average annual growth rate (%) 
 
GDP  
share 2003  Baseline   Irrigation  Extension  Roads  Market 
GDP  factor  cost  100.0  3.0 3.2  3.5 3.8 3.9 
      Agriculture  23.5  3.0 3.8  5.3 6.0 6.1 
      Cereals   2.9  2.5  3.1  4.2  4.6  4.6 
      Roots & tubers  3.1  0.9  1.7  4.4  4.8  4.6 
      Horticulture  3.7  4.0  4.6  10.6  11.4  11.2 
      Export crops  6.1  4.0  5.7  3.6  4.9  5.4 
      Livestock  6.6  3.0  3.0  4.4  5.0  5.1 
      Industry  21.2  2.8 2.6  2.5 2.4 2.7 
      Food processing  4.2  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.1  1.5 
   Private services  42.7  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.5 
   Public services  12.6  2.0  2.2  2.5  2.8  2.8 
Source: Kenyan CGE-microsimulation model 
Note: Food crops include all edible crops (such as cereals, roots, pulses); cash crops include both export and industrial crops 
(such as cut flowers, tea, horticulture, tobacco); light industry includes textiles, clothing, and wood and paper products; and heavy 
industry includes chemicals, petroleum, and machinery and equipment.  
This acceleration of agricultural growth under the irrigation scenario is driven by strong growth in 
export crops, especially tea and sugarcane, which have better access to foreign markets and are less 
constrained by domestic market opportunities. However, despite market constraints, food and 
horticultural crops, especially rice, pulses, and fruits and vegetables, grow more strongly as a result of 
irrigation and improved water management.
12 By contrast, the livestock sector remains unaffected since 
productivity in this sector is not directly linked to irrigation, and falling feed prices offset any resource 
competition with other sectors. However, extension services do affect livestock productivity and so there 
is more rapid growth in the livestock sector under the extension scenario. By contrast, public extension 
services do not directly increase productivity among export crops since these crops typically rely on 
private-sector schemes. Therefore, public extension services cause resource competition between export 
and other sectors, and the improved profitability of nonexport crops and livestock cause farmers to 
reallocate resources away from export crops. Accordingly, growth in export crops slows from 5.7 to 3.6 
percent under the extension scenario. The impact on traditional export crops is more pronounced, with 
production in tea and coffee slowing dramatically. This emphasizes the need to partner public service 
provision with private-sector initiatives, and as will be seen in subsequent scenarios, to increase rural 
infrastructure and market access for traditional export crops. 
Faster agricultural growth resulting from additional rural investments increases household 
incomes, especially in rural areas where most households engage in agricultural activities and therefore 
incomes are directly affected. Increasing irrigation and R&E spending causes the national poverty 
                                                      
12 See Table A4 in the appendix for detailed sectoral growth rates under the investment scenarios.   28
headcount to fall more than it does under the baseline scenario (Table 9). Poverty declines by an 
additional 1.8 percentage points under the irrigation scenario and by a further 3.4 percentage points under 
the extension scenario. The larger impact of extension services is partly due to the larger increase in 
investment spending under this scenario. Not surprisingly, rural poverty declines by more than urban 
poverty in both scenarios, and this is concentrated in the lowlands and midlands, since the highland 
region has better rainfall patterns and hence benefits less from irrigation investments. However, while the 
lowland and midland regions both benefit from irrigation, they are the regions that experience larger 
declines in poverty after improved R&E services. This is because these regions are already more heavily 
engaged in crops that benefit greatly from extension services, such as vegetables, wheat, and maize. 
Poverty in the lowlands does decline when incomes rise, primarily from oil crops and livestock. Finally, 
while irrigation improves rural incomes, it does little to reduce poverty in urban areas. However, 
extension services reduce food crop prices, thereby indirectly raising real incomes and lowering urban 
poverty by 0.7 percentage points by 2015. This is substantially less than the decline in rural poverty, 
which falls by 6.2 percentage points. Together, the model results suggest that increasing agricultural 
spending to 10 percent of total spending could lift an additional 1.6 million people above the poverty line 
by 2015, compared with the current growth path.
13 
Table 9.  Poverty outcomes under investment scenarios 
  Final year poverty rate in 2015 (%) 
 
Poverty 
rate 2003  Baseline   Irrigation  Extension  Roads  Market 
National  incidence  (P0)  51.3  48.1 46.3 42.9 40.9  39.5 
   Rural  51.9  47.8  45.7 41.6 39.3  37.6 
   Urban  47.6  49.5  49.3  48.8  48.7  48.4 
   Lowlands  61  60.0  57.1  54.7  53.8  52.3 
   Midlands  54.7  51.8  49.1  44.9  42.5  40.7 
   Highlands  41.4  34.3 34.2 30.8 28.7  27.3 
   Metropolitan  47.1  48.3  48.3  47.9  47.9  47.9 
National  depth  (P1)  17.9  18.0 16.6 14.9 13.8  13.2 
National  severity  (P2)  8.2  8.7 7.8 6.9 6.3  5.9 
Source: Kenyan CGE-microsimulation model 
Note: The microsimulation module is based on the 1997 WMSIII (GK, 2000) and thus initial poverty rates in the model are those 
for 1997. The official basic needs poverty line is set at Ksh1,239 (rural) (US$21) and Ksh2,648 (urban) (US$45) per adult per 
month (1997 prices).  
Increasing agricultural spending to meet the 10 percent target set by the Maputo Declaration can 
significantly reduce poverty. However, the decline in poverty falls far short of the MDG and the 
acceleration of agricultural growth does not reach the 6 percent growth target set by the CAADP 
                                                      
13 By 2015, Kenya will have a total population of 30.7 million people, and under the current growth path, there will be 14.7 
million people below the poverty line.    29
initiative. As such, the next section considers the impact of increasing spending on rural infrastructure and 
improving market development.  
Supporting Investments in Rural Roads and Market Development 
Apart from direct agricultural investments like irrigation and R&E, the literature also identifies poor 
market access and inadequate rural infrastructure as binding constraints to agricultural growth and rural 
development. Accordingly, in this section we increase government spending on rural feeder roads. Roads 
increase agricultural productivity in the same manner as irrigation from the previous section. While 
building new roads improves on-farm productivity, it also enables broader market development by 
reducing transaction costs for rural nonagricultural sectors. Government policies to improve rural 
distribution and marketing systems will also improve productivity for rural traders. Therefore, apart from 
a road investment scenario, we also consider a second scenario that simulates the development of rural 
markets. This is done by increasing productivity in the trade sector and reducing transaction costs for 
domestic and export agricultural sectors. Unlike the previous scenarios, we assume that there is no cost 
associated with this aspect of market development (in other words, the cost of building roads greatly 
overshadows the cost of implementing market-enabling policies). Therefore, while government spending 
increases under the roads scenario, it remains unchanged in the market scenario (Figure 5). Under the 
roads scenario, we increase the share of road expenditures in government spending by 2.7 percentage 
points, so that agricultural and new road expenditures reach 12.8 percent of total spending by 2015.
14 We 
assume that all additional spending is directed toward building rural feeder roads. This is equivalent to 
building an additional 67,500 kilometers of feeder roads by 2015, or alternatively, increasing Kenya’s 
road stock by two-fifths, or a third of its 2006 level. In the market scenario, we halve agricultural 
transaction costs and increase productivity in the rural trade sector by 3 percent per year during 2006–15. 
All crop and livestock sectors benefit from feeder roads. However, export and horticultural crops 
benefit more, since they are more heavily marketed and thus better positioned to take advantage of 
expanding market opportunities. Such crops include tea, cut flowers, and fruits and vegetables. By 
contrast, with the exception of wheat, cereal and root crops experience a slower acceleration of growth, 
since they are more constrained by domestic demand and by limited potential to displace imports. 
However, when road development is coupled with market development, as in the market scenario, then 
declining domestic transaction costs fosters stronger growth in cereals. This is because improvements in 
                                                      
14 Increasing spending on roads obviously reduces the share of agricultural spending, which in the previous scenarios 
targeted 10 percent of total spending. In order to isolate the effects of road investments on growth and poverty, we do not 
accelerate agricultural investment alongside road investments to maintain the 10 percent agricultural share.     30
domestic marketing favor the food processing sectors, which in turn provide an expanding market for 
cereal farmers. Traditional exports also benefit from lower transport costs under the market scenario.  
While it is not surprising that rural roads favors rural development, once road investments are 
coupled with policies to improve market access, then the benefits of investing in rural infrastructure are 
more broadly distributed. For example, national poverty declines by 2 percentage points under the roads 
scenario, but by a further 1.4 percent under the market scenario. Road and market development also 
reduces urban poverty, albeit only slightly (Figure 6). Road investments and market development favor 
poverty reduction in the midland and highland regions, which already have strong links to urban markets. 
However, the lowland region also benefits, since rural infrastructure is greatly lacking and transactions 
costs are initially high.  



















































Source: Kenya CGE-microsimulation model results 
Note: Outcomes are cumulative (for example, the roads scenario includes the outcomes from the irrigation and extension 
scenarios).  
Comparing the Impacts of Different Investments  
The poverty-growth and spending-growth elasticities estimated from the model results indicate that there 
is variation in the impact of different investments on growth and poverty (Table 10). Increasing 
government spending on irrigation by 1.00 percent causes a 0.06 percent increase in agricultural GDP, 
whereas spending an additional 1.00 percent on R&E and roads causes agricultural GDP to increase by 
0.13 and 0.08 percent, respectively. However, while irrigation spending is less effective at raising growth, 
its resulting growth is more effective at reducing poverty. A 1.0 percent increase in irrigation-induced 
growth causes national poverty to decline by 3.9 percent, compared to 2.1 for R&E and 2.4 percent for 
roads. Irrigation investments are also considerably more effective at reducing poverty among Kenya’s   31
poorest populations, as evidenced by its larger elasticity for the rural poverty gap and squared gap. This is 
because irrigation benefits the lowlands where poverty is more widespread and most severe. 
Table 10.  Poverty–growth elasticities and benefit–cost ratios under investment scenarios  
 Baseline    Irrigation  Extension  Roads  Market 
Poverty to growth  Percent change in poverty from 1 percent change in GDP  
   National headcount   -0.17  -3.88  -2.09  -2.44  -1.73 
      Rural headcount   -0.22 -4.60  -2.34  -2.91 -2.00 
         Rural gap   -0.16 -5.59  -3.38  -3.83 -2.65 
         Rural squared-gap    -0.11 -7.57  -3.79  -4.17 -3.28 
      Urban headcount   0.10  -0.22  -1.02  -0.10  -0.49 
         
Spending to growth  Percent change in GDP from 1 percent change in agricultural spending 
   Agriculture  -  0.06  0.13  0.08  - 
   All sectors  -  0.01  0.03  0.02  - 
GDP benefit–cost ratios  Ksh increase in GDP per shilling spent 
   Initial elasticity   -  2.6  6.3  3.0  - 
   Lower bound  -  0.7  4.1  1.6  - 
   Upper bound  -  4.5  8.6  4.4  - 
Poverty benefit–cost ratios   Poor people lifted out of poverty per Ksh million spent 
   Initial elasticity   -  29  103  21  - 
   Lower bound  -  19  64  12  - 
   Upper bound  -  42  139  32  - 
Source: Results from the Kenyan CGE-microsimulation model. Upper and lower bounds on the benefit–cost ratios assume a 25 
percent confidence interval around the relevant investment function elasticity. One million shillings is equivalent to US$12,658 
in 2003 prices. 
We estimate benefit–cost ratios for each of the investment scenarios. These suggest that the 
highest returns are from direct spending on R&E. For instance, Ksh1.0 spent on R&E during 2006–15 
causes GDP to increase by Ksh 6.3. By contrast, the return on irrigation and roads is 2.6 and 3.0 Kenyan 
shillings, respectively. Despite differing magnitudes, all investments have positive returns (that is, all 
benefit–cost ratios are greater than one). However, these estimated returns are sensitive to the elasticities 
in the productivity–investment function (equation 2). We conduct sensitivity analysis by assuming a 25 
percent confidence interval around our initial estimates (Table 7). The impact of changing the elasticities 
can be seen in Figure 7, which shows the average annual GDP growth under each of the investment 
scenarios. The horizontal bars show the agricultural and economy-wide GDP growth rates that are 
achieved under the upper and lower bound elasticity estimates for the relevant investment. It suggests that 
the agricultural growth rate under the irrigation scenario varies between 3.5 and 4.1 percent, averaging 3.8 
percent, assuming a 25 percent lower or higher elasticity. This sensitivity is also evident for R&E and 
road investments, although it is most pronounced for the former. This affects the estimated returns to 
investments. For instance, while there is a positive return to irrigation investment based on the initial 
elasticity estimate, there is a net loss under the lower bound estimate (the benefit–cost ratio is less than   32
one). Furthermore, the return on R&E varies from Ksh 4.1 to 8.6 per shilling spent. However, even under 
a lower bound estimate, the returns are higher than the initial estimates for irrigation and roads. Therefore, 
it suggests that, assuming a similar return to investments in Kenya as in Uganda and given a relatively 
wide margin of error, the returns to R&E are higher than the other investments considered.  
The ranking of investments changes when their impact on poverty is considered rather than 
growth. While irrigation offers the lower returns to growth, it has higher returns to poverty reduction than 
road development. This can be explained by considering the differences in spending–growth and poverty–
growth elasticities. The larger poverty–growth elasticity for irrigation offsets its smaller spending–growth 
elasticity. However, this is only when it is compared with road investments. Although R&E-induced 
growth is less effective in reducing poverty than irrigation-induced growth, R&E spending is considerably 
more effective at raising growth. It is this combination of “pro-poor” and “pro-growth” that makes R&E 
better at reducing poverty. An additional 103 people are lifted above the poverty line for every million 
shillings spent on R&E during 2006–15. Less than a third as many people would be lifted above the 
poverty line if those funds were spent on either irrigation or rural roads. However, despite the strong 
results for extension services, it should be remembered that irrigation spending is more effective at 
reducing poverty in the lowland region, where poverty is most severe, and that roads and market 
development generate broad-based agricultural growth and benefit urban consumers alongside rural 
households.  




















































Source: Kenya CGE-microsimulation model results 
Note: Outcomes are cumulative (for example, roads include the outcomes from irrigation and extension). Horizontal bars show 
upper and lower bounds after assuming a 25 percent confidence interval around the relevant investment function elasticity.    33
5.  CONCLUSIONS  
Our findings indicate that Kenya must focus its development strategy on accelerating economic growth, 
because under its current growth path there will be little change in poverty over the coming decade. 
However, under its current structure of growth, Kenya’s economy would have to grow by more than 10 
percent per year over the coming decade if it is to meet the MDG of halving poverty by 2015. Given the 
scale of this challenge, it is clear that no single sector can lead development on its own. However, since 
few countries have achieved and sustained such growth, it is also clear that Kenya must search for 
alternative sources of poverty-reducing growth. Here our findings strongly indicate that agricultural 
growth must play a more central role in Kenya’s development strategy. Without agricultural growth, it is 
unlikely that significant declines in poverty can be achieved, at least in the foreseeable future. The need 
for broad-based growth also applies to subsectors within agriculture, each of which will have to contribute 
to growth for Kenya’s development strategy to be successful. Despite differences across agricultural 
sectors, agriculture generally generates growth that is more beneficial to a majority of Kenyans. This is 
especially true for poorer households in less-favored regions. Therefore, it is unlikely that the current 
strategy, which is not optimistic about agriculture’s growth potential, can have a profound effect on 
poverty. Furthermore, an industry-led growth strategy that does not also increase investments in 
agriculture will exacerbate Kenya’s already high inequality. Even in urban areas, the gap between formal 
and informal sectors means that industrial policies geared toward the formal sector are unlikely to benefit 
the urban poor in large numbers. Therefore, our findings conclude that, as Kenya prepares its new 
national strategy, the country should direct greater emphasis and resources toward accelerating 
agricultural growth.  
We have explored how agricultural growth can be accelerated through increasing public spending 
on agriculture and the rural sector. We find that increasing agricultural spending to meet the 10 percent 
target set by the Maputo Declaration can lift an additional 1.5 million people above the poverty line by 
2015. Irrigation and R&E greatly accelerate growth for both food and export crops and benefit households 
throughout the country. Specific investments have higher returns in different parts of the country. 
Irrigation investments favor the lowlands and Kenya’s poorest populations, whereas R&E favors the 
midlands and highlands. R&E is found to have the highest returns in terms of both growth and poverty 
reduction. However, the reduction in poverty resulting from meeting the 10 percent agricultural spending 
target is only one-third of the reduction required to meet the MDG. Furthermore, increasing agricultural 
spending to 10 percent of total spending is insufficient to meet the CAADP agricultural growth target of 6 
percent. Achieving this target will require additional nonagricultural investments, such as improved rural 
infrastructure and rural market development. Whereas building rural roads and reducing transaction costs   34
is an expensive option, we find that these investments significantly reduce rural poverty and encourage 
growth that extends beyond rural areas.  
The total cost of increasing agricultural and rural investments to achieve the 6 percent CAADP 
growth target is about $127 million per year during 2006–15 in 2003 prices. The additional spending over 
and above the 10 percent committed to under the Maputo Declaration is $54.9 million. However, 
improving the efficiency of government investments could reduce these cost estimates. We have shown 
that even slight improvements in the relationship between investment and productivity can greatly 
improve growth and poverty outcomes. Therefore, while it is necessary to increase spending on 
agriculture, the fiscal burden of an agricultural growth strategy can be reduced through better fiscal 
management and implementation. Finally, we find that while the 6 percent agricultural growth target set 
under the CAADP initiative will cause a significant decline in poverty, it still falls far short of halving 
poverty by 2015. Therefore, while agricultural growth should be given a more central role in Kenya’s 
development strategy, it will also be necessary to continue to encourage urban and nonagricultural 
growth. However, Kenya’s development strategy will have to move beyond its current emphasis on 
formal industrialization if the benefits of future growth are to be shared throughout the population.    35
APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 
Table A1.  Structure of the Kenyan economy, 2003  
Urban economy  Agrological region 
 
National 
economy Informal Formal 
Rural 
economy Lowlands Midlands    Highlands 
Metropolita
n centers 
  Contribution to national gross domestic product (%) 
GDP factor cost  100.0  12.0  54.7  33.2  4.7  24.9  14.1  56.3 
Agriculture 100.0  5.7  6.9  87.4  5.6  60.2  32.6  1.7 
Industry 100.0  12.1  68.5  19.4  2.9  11.3  9.6  76.2 
Services 100.0  14.7  69.8  15.5  5.1  15.1  8.0  71.8 
  Contribution to region and economy’s gross domestic product (%) 
GDP factor cost  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Agriculture  23.5  11.1 3.0  61.8 27.6 56.9 54.3  0.7 
Cereals    3.1  0.1  0.0  9.3 5.1 9.0 4.5  0.0 
Roots and oils   3.0  0.1  0.1  8.8  3.7  9.1  3.7  0.0 
Horticulture  3.6  0.2  0.0  10.8 1.8 7.4  12.1  0.0 
Export crops  6.4  0.2  0.3  18.8  2.4  13.9  20.3  0.0 
Livestock  6.3  10.5 1.0  13.3 12.9 15.2 12.7  0.1 
Forestry and fishing  1.1  0.0  1.6  0.7  1.8  2.2  1.1  0.6 
Industry 21.8  21.9  27.3  12.7  13.1  9.9  14.8  29.5 
Food  processing  4.1  2.1  4.6  4.1 2.6 1.9 2.3  5.7 
Services  54.7  66.9  69.8  25.5 59.3 33.2 30.9  69.8 
Retail  trade  6.5  23.4  1.8  8.2 9.5 5.6 4.0  7.3 
Public  services  14.9 0.4  20.8  10.3 25.0 19.9 13.4  12.2 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 2003 Kenyan social accounting matrix (Kiringai, Thurlow, and Wanjala 2006)Note: 
Informal economy comprises private businesses or activities in urban areas that are not registered to pay taxes; Lowland, midland 
and highland refer to agro-ecological regions; metropolitan includes cities and towns with over 100,000 residents.   36
Table A2.  Sectors and commodities in the CGE-microsimulation model 
Agriculture Industry  Services 
Cereal crops  Food processing  Private services 
   Maize     Meat & dairy      Trade 
   Wheat      Grain milling     Hotels 
   Rice     Sugar, bakery & confectionary     Transport 
   Barley     Beverages & tobacco     Communication 
   Other cereals     Other manufactured food     Finance 
Roots and oil crops  Light industry     Real estate 
   Roots & tubers     Textile & clothing     Other services 
   Pulses & oil seeds     Leather & footwear  Public services 
Horticultural crops     Wood & paper     Health 
   Fruits     Printing and publishing     Education 
   Vegetables  Heavy industry     Roads 
Export crops     Mining     Agricultural irrigation 
   Cotton     Petroleum        Agricultural research and extension 
   Sugarcane     Chemicals     Other agriculture 
   Coffee     Metals and machines     Administration and other  
   Tea     Nonmetallic products   
   Cut flowers     Other manufactures   
   Others cash crops  Other industry   
Livestock     Water    
   Beef     Electricity    
   Dairy     Construction   
   Poultry     
   Sheep, goat, and lamb for slaughter     
   Other livestock     
Other agriculture    
   Fishing     
   Forestry        
Table A3.  Assumptions in calibrating the baseline scenario 
 Annual 
growth rate 
Source and notes 
Population   1.9% 
   Rural  1.5% 
   Urban  2.4% 
WMSIII (GK 2000) and World Bank (2006). Baseline 
assumes a slowdown in urbanization and overall population 
growth (as per observed trends). 
Labor supply  2.2% 
   Skilled labor  2.2% 
   Semi-skilled labor  1.9% 
   Unskilled labor  3.0% 
Skilled and semi-skilled growth rate based on weighted 
rural/urban population growth rates. Unskilled labor supply 
is endogenous, based on labor demand (shown here only for 
comparison). 
Land supply  1.0%  FAOSTAT (2006). Average area growth, 1990-2004  
Capital depreciation rate  7.0% 
Capital–output ratio  2.0 
Onjala (2002). Higher than Odhiambo et al. (2004) but 
produces a consistent capital stock growth rate. 
Foreign capital inflows  1.0% 
World commodity prices  -0.5% 
World Bank (2006). Change in  
terms-of-trade and current account  
Government recurrent spending  1.5%  Average growth rate for 2000–04 (Table 1).  
Sector growth rates  Table 2  National accounts, Government of Kenya 
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Table A4.  Detailed growth rates under investment scenarios 
  Annual GDP growth rate (%), 2006–15 
 
GDP 
share 2003  Baseline Irrigation  Extension  Roads  Market 
Cereal crops  2.9 2.5 3.0 4.3 4.4  5.1 
   Maize  2.6  2.5  3.1  4.1  4.5  4.6 
   Wheat   0.0  1.0  1.5  9.3  9.9  7.8 
   Rice  0.1  3.0  4.5  5.4  5.5  5.6 
   Barley  0.1  0.4  0.5  1.2  1.2  1.4 
   Other cereals  0.0  -1.8  -0.6  4.5  5.2  7.5 
Roots and oil crops  3.1 0.9 1.5 4.8 4.9  5.0 
   Roots & tubers  1.1  2.1  2.7  3.8  4.2  4.3 
   Pulses & oil seeds  2.0  0.1  1.0  4.7  5.1  4.7 
Horticultural crops  3.7 4.0 4.5  11.7  12.1  12.1 
   Fruits  1.4  3.0  3.9  7.7  8.1  8.0 
   Vegetables  2.3  4.5  5.0  12.0  13.0  12.8 
Export crops  6.1 4.0 5.3 2.4 3.3  3.4 
   Cotton  0.0  0.7  0.9  1.1  1.3  1.5 
   Sugarcane  0.2  3.0  3.4  3.0  3.1  2.4 
   Coffee  0.6  3.0  2.1  -1.6  -2.5  6.8 
   Tea  3.5  4.0  7.4  4.8  6.9  7.3 
   Cut flowers  1.1  4.5  2.7  1.1  1.7  -3.5 
   Others cash crops  0.8  4.0  4.3  4.3  4.4  4.2 
Livestock  6.6 3.0 3.0 4.7 4.9  5.4 
   Beef  1.6  3.0  3.0  4.1  4.6  4.8 
   Dairy  2.5  3.0  3.1  4.6  5.2  5.3 
   Poultry  1.6  3.0  2.9  4.5  5.1  5.2 
   Sheep, goat & lamb   0.5  3.0  2.9  4.4  5.0  5.1 
   Other livestock  0.4  3.0  2.9  4.7  5.4  5.5 
Food processing  4.2 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9  2.1 
   Meat & dairy   1.2  1.0  0.8  1.0  1.2  1.6 
   Grain milling  0.9  1.0  1.2  1.4  1.7  2.0 
   Sugar and bakery   0.5  1.0  1.1  1.0  1.2  1.5 
   Beverages & tobacco  1.5  1.0  0.9  0.7  0.7  1.2 
   Other foods  0.1  1.0  -0.2  -0.9  -1.4  0.8 
Source: Kenyan CGE–microsimulation model 
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